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This study documents a negative relationship between foreign ownership and future 
volatility of Indonesian stocks. This calming effect of foreign ownership is present 
before, during, and after the Asian financial crisis. It is independent of gross and net 
foreign trading and the stock’s historical volatility.  The effect increases with the level 
of foreign holdings.  The findings are contrary to the volatility impact of institutional 
ownership in developed markets, and indicate the presence of different economic 
mechanisms leading to opposite volatility impact from foreign ownership and foreign 
trading.   
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Emerging equity markets have much higher volatility than developed markets.  High 
volatility increases the cost of capital, deters investments, and impedes long-run market 
development.  Understanding the determinants of emerging market volatility is important for 
investors and policymakers. The financial crises in the 1990s have led to many studies on the 
volatility impact of foreign investors.  Early studies compare volatility surrounding the events 
of market openings in late 1980s and early 1990s.  Most of them, e.g. De Santis and 
İmrohoroğlu (1997), Bekaert and Harvey (1995, 1997, 1998, 2000), Henry (2000), and Kim 
and Singal (2000), find market opening to be associated with stable or lower volatility. 
However, Roll (1995) was the first to document a surge in volatility following market 
opening in Indonesia in late 1988.  Levine and Zervos (1998) presents evidence of greater 
volatility associated with market opening in 16 countries. More recently Bae, et al. (2004) 
investigates whether restrictions on foreign ownership affect stock volatility in emerging 
markets.  They report a robust positive relationship between a stock’s accessibility to foreign 
investors and its volatility. Based on daily trading activities of foreign investors in six Asian 
emerging markets, Richards (2005) finds much greater price impact from foreign trading than 
previously reported. Wang (2007a) shows that even though foreign selling accounted for only 
15% of daily trading volume in Indonesia, it had a dominant impact on the volatility of the 
Jakarta Composite Index.   
This study explores Granger causality from foreign ownership to stock volatility in 
Indonesia: whether and how foreign ownership affects future volatility. This causal 
relationship affects future volatility dynamics, therefore asset allocation decisions.  More 
importantly, it has been regarded as a critical test for the benefits of market opening and 
foreign portfolio investments. If, ceteris paribus, foreign participation leads to greater risk 
sharing, enhanced liquidity, and improved corporate governance and disclosure, these 
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benefits should result in lower future volatility for stocks with greater foreign ownership. 
Conversely, if greater foreign ownership were associated with greater volatility, as suggested 
by Bae, et al. (2004), it would cast doubt on the benefits of foreign participation to emerging 
markets. This causal relationship has not been examined in the existent literature.   
A key feature of this study is that we separate the volatility impact of foreign 
ownership from that of foreign trading.  Theory1 and empirical studies have shown that 
trading in general, and foreign trading in particular, leads to higher volatility.  However, as 
discussed in section II, foreign ownership of an emerging market stock may lead to lower 
volatility.  For example, foreign ownership increases a stock’s investor base, leading to 
greater risk sharing and lower volatility.  It also attracts greater analyst following, which 
helps reduce information asymmetry.  Using detailed data on foreign ownership and foreign 
trading in Indonesia, this paper tests the hypothesis that after controlling the impact of foreign 
trading, foreign ownership has a negative, i.e. stabilizing, effect on future volatility.  We 
examine the cross-sectional relationship between a stock’s volatility in a month (or quarter) 
and foreign ownership in the previous month (or quarter), while controlling for a range of 
contemporaneous and lagged variables. While there is a positive contemporaneous 
relationship between foreign trading and stock volatility, we show that the level of foreign 
ownership is negatively related to subsequent volatility. This result is independent of the net 
trading by foreign investors: if two stocks have the same amount of foreign trading in the 
same direction, the one with the higher foreign ownership has lower future volatility. 
Therefore it is different from the findings of Wang (2007) where daily foreign selling has a 
strong contemporaneous impact on daily market volatility.  The finding is also independent of 
past volatility: if two stocks have the same past volatility, the one with the higher foreign 
ownership has lower future volatility. Thus the finding is not driven by foreign preference for 
                                                 
1 The mixture of distribution hypothesis in market microstructure literature provides a theoretical link between 
trading activity and price volatility. See Andersen (1996) and references therein.  
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stocks with low historical volatility. Our findings are consistent with Agudelo (2010) which 
documents a positive liquidity impact from foreign ownership and a negative impact from 
foreign trading. Furthermore, we find that the relationship between volatility and foreign 
ownership is nonlinear: the stabilizing effect increases with the level of foreign ownership.  
These findings hold for all sub-periods before, during, and after the Asian financial crisis. 
They show the complex effects of foreign participation, and point to different economic 
mechanisms leading to opposite effects from foreign ownership and foreign trading.   
The stabilizing effect documented in this paper is consistent with the findings from 
Korea by Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999) and Kim and Wei (2002). These studies show that 
foreign investors, particularly offshore investment funds, do not destabilize the Korean stock 
market, therefore “are not especially worrisome monsters.” As discussed in section II, there 
are several economic mechanisms through which foreign ownership may lead to lower stock 
volatility. These mechanisms are present in most emerging markets.  For example, there is 
evidence that foreign institutions are better monitors of company management in India 
(Khanna and Palepu, 1999). Foreign analysts are better than local analysts in several Latin 
American emerging markets (Bacmann and Bolliger, 2001).  The positive effect from foreign 
ownership to corporate governance and profitability is documented in 28 emerging markets 
(Mitton, 2006).  Indeed a recent study by Li, et al. (2011) confirms that the stabilizing effect 
of large foreign ownership (>5%) is present in 31 emerging markets.   
The stabilizing effect of foreign ownership suggests that any adverse effect on the 
local markets from foreign participation is likely to come from foreign trading, in particular 
foreign selling, and not from foreign ownership per se. Herding and positive feedback trading 
by foreign investors have been documented by many studies in many markets, e.g. 
Dornbusch and Park (1995) and recently Hsieh, et al. (2011).  Foreign trading tends to create 
large market reaction due to their reputation as sophisticated investors, their perceived 
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information advantage, and their large trading size. The positive effects of foreign ownership 
on corporate governance and profitability (Mitton, 2006) lead to strong market reaction to 
foreign selling.  This may explain the love-hate relationship between foreign investors and 
emerging market policymakers and regulators.  An implication of the finding is that emerging 
market policymakers should pay more attention to retaining foreign investments, as oppose to 
attracting more foreign investments. If not, domestic capital markets become a short stop for 
foreign investments, resulting in adverse market impact without the expected benefits.     
The finding of this paper also has implication for future research in developed 
markets.  Foreign investors in emerging markets are overwhelmingly financial institutions 
from developed markets2. The volatility impact of institutional investors in their home 
markets has been investigated by many studies3.  However the literature has not made the 
distinction between the volatility impact of institutional ownership and trading.  Most studies 
use institutional ownership as a proxy for institutional trading, and find a positive relationship 
between institutional ownership and volatility. Studies of corporate governance4, on the other 
hand, suggest a positive impact of institutional ownership on shareholder monitoring and 
corporate governance, which should lead to lower future volatility.  Our empirical finding 
makes a strong case for the joint analysis of the volatility impact of institutional ownership 
and institutional trading in developed markets.  Since institutional ownership and trading are 
positively correlated, omitting one variable will lead to biased coefficients for the other.   
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides a brief literature review and 
develops the main hypothesis to be tested.  Section III explains the data and features of 
foreign ownership in Indonesia. The causality from foreign ownership to future stock 
volatility is tested in section IV. The paper concludes in section V.  
                                                 
2 For example, Kim and Wei (1999) shows that foreign institutions accounted for 99.6% of foreign holdings in 
Korea in mid-1998, and U.S. institutions accounted for 61.5% of the total foreign institutional holdings.   
3 A partial list includes Potter (1992), Sias (1996), Xu and Malkiel (2003), Bushee (2004), Brandt, et al. (2005), 
Dennis and Strickland (2005), Chang and Dong (2005), and Gabaix, et al. (2006).   
4 See the review and discussion by Gillan and Stark (2003).  
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II. Foreign Ownership and Stock Volatility: Hypothesis Development 
Most studies of the impact of foreign investors can be divided into three groups. Early 
studies, e.g. De Santis and İmrohoroğlu (1997), Bekaert and Harvey (1995, 1997, 1998, 
2000), Errunza (1999), Henry (2000), and Kim and Singal (2000), compare volatility before 
and after market liberalization without detailed data on the level of foreign participation.  The 
second group is based on foreign trading, e.g. Richards (2005), Wang (2007a), Agarwal, et al. 
(2009), among others.  Using daily trading data by foreign and domestic investors, Richards 
(2005) and Wang (2007a) demonstrate a strong positive link between foreign trading, 
particularly foreign selling, and local market volatility.  The last group is based on foreign 
ownership, e.g. Huang and Shiu (2005), Wang (2007b), Li, et al. (2011).   
This study is among the few that provide a joint estimate of the effects of foreign 
ownership versus foreign trading. In particular, we develop and test the hypothesis that after 
controlling the effect of foreign trading, foreign ownership has a stabilizing effect on stock 
volatility.  There are several economic mechanisms that support this hypothesis.  First, 
foreign ownership increases the investor base, leading to greater risk sharing and higher 
return (Merton, 1987). A simple extension of Merton’s model shows that greater investor 
base also reduces volatility (Wang, 2007a). Second, foreign institutional ownership attracts 
greater analyst following, thus reducing information asymmetry surrounding a stock (O’Brien 
and Bhushan, 1990; Kini and Mian, 1995). Foreign institutions are better monitors of 
company management than local institutions (Khanna and Palepu, 1999) and foreign analysts 
produce more timely and accurate forecasts than local analysts (Bacmann and Bolliger, 
2001). Indeed Wang (2007b) shows that in Indonesia, stocks with high foreign ownership 
tend to lead stocks with low foreign ownership in price movements.  Dvorak (2005) and Bae, 
et al. (2011) show that foreign investors have better investment performance than local 
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investors in Indonesia and Korea5.  Finally, there is a large body of literature showing the 
positive impact of foreign institutional investors on corporate governance, disclosure, and 
operational profits, which again leads to better returns and lower volatility.  Foreign 
institutional ownership tends to improve corporate governance and profitability (D’Souza, et 
al., 2005, Mitton, 2006), and help firms to recover from financial stress (Blalock, et al., 
2005).  When faced with agency conflicts, foreign institutions are more likely to raise 
objection (Gillan and Stark, 2003), therefore have a deterrence effect on managerial 
expropriation (Johnson, et al., 2000)6. Taken together, the evidence suggests that foreign 
ownership should have a calming effect on volatility, opposite to that of foreign trading 
activity.7  By separating the volatility impact of foreign ownership and trading, we provide 
new insight into the impact of market opening and foreign participation.   
III. Data and Preliminary Analysis 
 
The Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) publishes daily foreign holdings of individual 
stocks. Our data include stock code, daily high, low, and closing prices, daily trading volume, 
rupiah value, and the number of transactions, shares outstanding, and end-of-day foreign 
share holding in each stock. The sample period is from 1 January 1996 to 22 December 2000 
and has 1212 trading days. After removing records with obvious errors, e.g. missing price 
(price=0), duplicate records (same stock with two trading records on the same day), daily 
high being less than daily low, etc, our initial sample has 329,393 stock-day records.   
Our sample covers the Asian financial crisis period.  Given the severity of the crisis, it 
is sensible to divide the full sample into three sub-periods: before, during, and after the Asian 
                                                 
5 The high reputation of foreign investors in small open markets may also explain their superior investment 
performance, e.g. Yoo (2011), and consequently the stabilizing effect of foreign ownership.   
6 Gillan and Starks (2003) provides a detailed discussion on direct and indirect influences of foreign institutional 
investment on corporate governance.  They report that some large US pension funds have directly sought to 
improve corporate governance in their overseas holdings.   
7 The findings of a positive relationship between a stock’s investibility and its volatility (Bae, et al., 2004) may 
reflect the impact of foreign trading, as oppose to foreign ownership restrictions.   
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crisis.  Figure 1 depicts the Jakarta Composite Index (JCI) and the IDR/USD exchange rate. 
The stock market in Indonesia had a bull run in 1996 and the first half of 1997.  The crisis hit 
Indonesia in early August 1997.  The stock market crashed after August 5, and the Rupiah 
was floated on August 14. The crisis deepened through the rest of 1997 and early 1998.  In 
May 1998, Suharto resigned as the Indonesian President and a new rescue package was 
signed with the International Monetary Fund. The JCI began a strong and sustained recovery 
after October 6, 1998.  The rupiah also experienced a substantial surge against US dollar in 
the second week of October.  We take August 5, 1997, as the start of the crisis for Indonesia, 
and October 7, 1998, as the start of the recovery.  Using alternative dates for the Asian crisis, 
e.g. July 1997 to August 1998 as in Johnson and Mitton (2003) and Lemmon and Lins 
(2003), does not alter the main results.   
Table 1 provides a brief summary of the JSX. Over the sample period, the number of 
listings increased from 271 to 289. The market was highly concentrated: the top 10 stocks 
accounted for over 50% of the total market capitalization, and the concentration increased 
over the sample period. Although trading activity increased substantially, the average 
transaction size decreased after the start of the Asian crisis. Over 35% of listed stocks were 
not traded on an average trading day.  Our analyses are based on active stocks, defined as 
those traded more than 5 days in a month.  Overall only 136 of the 289 stocks are considered 
being active. The JCI was up almost 40% from early 1996 to mid-1997.  The crisis period 
saw the JCI losing over 63% of its value and is accompanied by a surge in volatility.  
Figure 2 and Panel A of Table 1 depict the aggregate foreign ownership over the 
sample period.  The percentage foreign holdings, by shares and rupiah value, were relatively 
stable except in the second half of 2000 when they had several large drops.  Overall there was 
no evidence of massive capital outflows from Indonesia’s equity market during the Asian 
crisis.  Foreign holding in rupiah value decreased by only 3.2% compared to the decline in 
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the JCI by 63.4% over the period, indicating capital inflows from foreign investors. Indeed 
foreign shareholding increased by 5.5 billion over the crisis period, even though the 
percentage shareholding dropped by 4.9% because of the increase in the total shares 
outstanding from the 18 newly listed stocks.  It appears that foreign investors took advantage 
of the low share prices and rupiah value and increased their share holding in Indonesia during 
the crisis period.  Other studies8 report capital inflows in Korea and Thailand.  There was a 
surge in the total shares outstanding and foreign shareholding in early April 1999.9 Foreign 
percentage holdings increased only slightly, and began to decrease in the second half of 2000.   
Panels B and C of Table 2 report foreign ownership by market capitalization and by 
daily turnover.  Foreign investors in Indonesia do not favor large stocks and high turnover 
stocks as suggested in previous studies.  For the full sample, the largest 50 stocks accounted 
for 78.3% of the total market capitalization in Indonesia and 79.3% of the total foreign 
holding in Indonesia.  On average foreign investors hold 27.6% of the top 50 stocks.  The 
market weight for the next 100 stocks is 16%, while their weight in the aggregate foreign 
portfolio is 15.9%.  The market weights and foreign portfolio weights are very similar across 
different market capitalization groups in all three sub-periods.  Foreign investors do not favor 
stocks with the highest turnover, except during the Asian crisis.  Despite the higher volatility 
and greater trading activities during the crisis, the turnover ratio is actually lower.  This is 
consistent with smaller transaction size and more stocks not being traded during the crisis 
(Table 1).  Panel D of Table 2 shows foreign ownership distribution across active stocks, 
those traded more than 5 days in a month.  The distribution shifted towards the lower end of 
percentage holdings during the Asian crisis.   
                                                 
8 Kim and Wei (1999) report that foreign holdings in Korea increased from 7.06 to 8.58 trillion won between 
November 1997 and June 1998. Wang (2007a) reports that foreign investors were net buyers of 64 billion baht 
of Thai stocks during the crisis. 
9 Between March 30 and April 6, 1999, the total shares outstanding on the JSX increased from 154 billion to 
472 billion.  Three banks, Bank Danamon (BDMN), Bank International Indonesia (BNII), and Bank Tiara Asia 
(BNTA), increased shares outstanding by about 320 billion, while prices of these banks remained steady. 
Foreign shareholding increased from 36.2 billion to 118 billion.   
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IV. Foreign Ownership and Future Volatility 
The causality from institutional ownership to stock volatility in the United States has 
been examined by Sias (1996) and Xu and Malkiel (2003).  Sias (1996) performs cross-
sectional regressions of firm-level volatility on changes in institutional ownership, while Xu 
and Malkiel (2003) estimate cross-sectional regressions of firm-level idiosyncratic volatility 
on the level of institutional ownership.  Both report a positive impact from institutional 
ownership to future volatility. Brandt, et al. (2005) disputes the findings of Xu and Malkiel 
(2003) and reports a negative relationship between institutional ownership and idiosyncratic 
volatility among low-priced stocks.   
Our empirical model is in the same spirit as Sias (1996) and Xu and Malkiel (2003), 
but has several important differences. Instead of annual analysis, we conduct monthly and 
quarterly analyses which are more relevant for investment decisions.  More importantly, we 
control for the volatility impact of gross and net foreign trading. Although net foreign trading 
determines the level of foreign ownership, we expect ownership to have an independent 
effect on volatility as discussed in section I. We also control for other firm characteristics that 
may affect foreign holding preference: e.g. foreign investors may prefer stocks with low 
historical volatility which may have low future volatility. We control for historical volatility 
and compare stocks with the same historical volatility but different foreign holdings. 
Specifically foreign impact on future volatility is examined using the following model:  
 ln(σi,t) = β0+β1ln(σi,t-1)+β2ln(σi,t-2)+β3ln(MCAPi,t-1) +β4TOVERi,t +β5ri,t 
+β6ri,t-1+β7FTi,t+β8ΔFHi,t+β9FHi,t-1+εi,t 
where σi,t is stock i’s volatility in month t, MCAPi,t is the average market capitalization in 
month t, TOVERi,t is turnover, ri,t is return in month t, FTi,t is foreign trading, and FHi,t is the 
percentage foreign holding at the end of month t.  Monthly volatility is calculated as  ߪ௜,௧ ൌ
ට∑ ൣln	ሺܪ௜,ௗ ܮ௜,ௗ⁄ ሻ൧ଶௌୀଵ where Hi,d and Li,d are the daily high and low prices of stock i, and M 
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is the number of trading days in the month.  The use of daily range as a volatility measure has 
been support by several studies, e.g. Alizadeh, et al. (2002).  Using daily returns to calculate 
monthly volatility does not alter the main results. Foreign trading FTi,t is approximated by the 
sum of the absolute changes of daily foreign shareholdings for stock i during month t. In 
order to obtain reliable volatility estimates for each month, we use only the active stocks, 
those traded more than 5 days in a month, for the analysis.   
The full-sample results at monthly intervals are reported in Panel A of Table 3.  
Model (1) includes only lagged variables.  Model (2) includes contemporaneous return and 
turnover.  Model (3) includes contemporaneous foreign gross and net trading.  The modified 










where “St. Dev.” is the standard deviation across all months, ρ(1) is the first-order 
autocorrelation of the estimated coefficients, and T is the number of month (Cochrane, 2001). 
Overall volatility increases with turnover, is inversely related to lagged returns, but is 
unaffected by market capitalization or current returns. In all three specifications, volatility is 
negatively related to past foreign holdings. Since foreign trading is positively correlated with 
foreign holding and has a positive impact on volatility, omitting FTi,t leads to an 
overestimation of β9.10  Indeed β9 in models (1) and (2) are larger than in model (3).  Adding 
FTi,t in model (3) strengthens the negative relationship between foreign holdings and future 
volatility.  Since foreign investors do not trade in the same direction, FTi,t still underestimates 
the actual monthly foreign volume.  Therefore β7 is likely to be underestimated, which again 
may lead to an overestimation of β9.  When FTi,t is properly measured, the inverse 
relationship between σi,t and FHi,t-1 should be stronger than reported.  
                                                 








  (Greene, 2003, p148). 
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Panel B reports the results for quarterly estimations of model (3).  Foreign net 
purchase, ΔFHi,t, is no longer significant.  But foreign holdings in the previous quarter still 
have a negative impact on current volatility.  Panel C of Table 3 reports monthly sub-period 
estimations for model (3).  Foreign holdings had a calming effect on future volatility in all 
three sub-periods.  Before the crisis, large stocks had lower volatility.  The Indonesian market 
had a bull run, and volatility becomes higher as the prices moved higher (β5>0). During the 
crisis period, volatility appeared to be unrelated to trading activities: Turnover (TOVER), 
gross foreign trading (FT), and net foreign trading (ΔFH) were all unrelated to volatility.  It is 
likely that volatility was driven by severe currency depreciations and the overall macro 
uncertainty related to leadership changes and IMF programs.  Interestingly the calming effect 
of foreign holdings was strongest during the crisis period.  After the crisis the calming effect 
of foreign ownership became weaker but remained significant.   
Panel D of Table 3 explores possible nonlinear relationships between volatility and 
foreign holdings: the impact of foreign holdings may be a function of the level of foreign 
holdings.  We separate stocks into groups with foreign holdings below 15%, between 15-
30%, between 30-45%, and above 45%.  The average numbers of stocks in these groups are 
reported in Panel D of Table 2.  The full-sample results show that as foreign holding 
increases, the coefficients become more negative with greater statistical significance.  Across 
sub-periods, the statistical significance of different foreign holding groups varies.  During the 
crisis, only foreign holdings above 45% had a significant calming effect on future volatility.  
After the crisis, foreign holdings above 15% contributed to lower future volatility.   
V. Conclusion 
Recent studies, e.g. Bae, et al. (2003) and Wang (2007), link foreign participation to 
greater volatility in emerging markets.  This study shows that after controlling for gross and 
net foreign trading, foreign ownership has a calming effect on future stock volatility.  The 
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effect is robust to foreign preference for historical volatility, alternative specifications, and 
sub-period analyses. There are several economic mechanisms that may potentially explain the 
calming effect of foreign ownership on future volatility: increased risk sharing and higher 
return, positive signaling and greater investor confidence, and positive impact on corporate 
governance, disclosure, and operational profits.  An important future research topic is to 
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Table 1: JSX Summary 
 
This table provides a summary of listing and trading on the JSX. “Number of stocks listed” is 
at the end of the period. “JCI return” is the JCI index return over the period.   All other 
numbers are daily averages for the period.  “Top 10” is the market capitalization of the top 10 
largest stocks relative to the total.  “No trading” is the percentage of stocks not traded on a 
trading day.  “Active stocks” is the average number of stocks traded more than 5 days in a 















Stocks listed 289 271 289 289 
Market Cap. (tri. rupiah) 245 201 182 312 
Top 10 (%) 56 53 55 60 
Volume (million shares) 333 117 298 510 
Value (billion rupiah) 348 238 329 438 
Number of transactions  13642 8382 13339 17655 
Transaction Size (mil. rupiah) 25.5 28.4 24.7 24.8 
No trading (%) 36.7 37.2 38.0 35.5 
Active stocks 136 132 145 137 
JCI return (%) -18.8 39.3 -63.4 59.4 




Table 2: Foreign Ownership in Indonesia 
 











Shares (billion) (%)* (billion) (%)* (billion) (%)* 
Average 18.4 26.8 34.4 25.3 133.6 20.3 
High 30.4 28.7 36.4 28.5 179.1 28.8 
Low 11.5 25.0 29.8 23.4 35.4 11.7 
Change 18.9 3.4 5.5 -4.9 127.1 -9.7 
       
Rupiah Value  (trillion) (%)** (trillion) (%)** (trillion) (%)** 
Average 54.8 27.2 47.3 25.9 80.8 25.8 
High 74.7 28.7 71.5 28.4 135.4 30.3 
Low 40.4 26.0 27.5 22.9 27.0 20.9 
Change 33.3 1.9 -43.6 -3.2 26.5 -4.2 
* Percentage of the total shares outstanding.  
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Table 2 – Continued 
 
Panel B: Foreign Ownership by Market Capitalization 
 Top 50 Medium 100 Remaining Stocks 
Full Sample    
% of Market Capitalization 78.3 16.0 5.7 
% of Foreign Holding 79.3 15.9 4.8 
Average Foreign Holding (%) 27.6 24.8 21.6 
Before Crisis    
% of Market Capitalization 78.2 17.7 4.0 
% of Foreign Holding 78.2 18.3 3.5 
Average Foreign Holding (%) 31.3 27.1 24.1 
During Crisis    
% of Market Capitalization 80.9 14.8 4.3 
% of Foreign Holding 80.2 16.1 3.7 
Average Foreign Holding (%) 27.0 25.9 21.5 
After Crisis    
% of Market Capitalization 84.0 12.1 3.9 
% of Foreign Holding 84.8 11.7 3.5 
Average Foreign Holding (%) 24.8 25.1 22.8 
 
Panel C: Foreign Ownership by Daily Turnover 
 Top 50 Medium 100 Remaining Stocks 
Full Sample    
Average Turnover (%) 0.98 0.28 0.07 
Average Foreign Holding (%) 21.7 27.2 22.0 
Before Crisis    
Average Turnover (%) 1.46 0.26 0.04 
Average Foreign Holding (%) 22.5 28.0 27.1 
During Crisis    
Average Turnover (%) 0.77 0.18 0.02 
Average Foreign Holding (%) 25.9 24.6 22.7 
After Crisis    
Average Turnover (%) 1.04 0.26 0.04 
Average Foreign Holding (%) 25.6 26.0 21.9 
 
Panel D: Foreign Ownership of Active Stocks* 
 Number of  Active Stocks 
Foreign Ownership Distribution 
<15%  (15%,30%]  (30%,45%] >45% 
Full Sample 136 37 42 37 20 
Before Crisis 132 27 40 44 21 
During Crisis 145 43 49 39 14 
After Crisis 137 42 41 32 22 
*Stocks traded more than 5 days in a month.   
18 
 
Table 3: Impact of Foreign Holdings on Volatility 
 
This table reports the following cross-sectional regression: 
ln(σi,t) = β0+β1ln(σi,t-1)+β2ln(σi,t-2)+β3ln(MCAPi,t-1) +β4TOVERi,t +β5ri,t +β6ri,t-1+β7FTi,t+β8ΔFHi,t+β9FHi,t-1+εi,t 
where σi,t is the return volatility of stock i in month t; MCAPi,t is the median market capitalization; ri,t is the monthly return; FHi,t is the 
percentage foreign holding at the end of the month; TOVERi,t is turnover in month t; FTi,t is the sum of the absolute changes in daily foreign 
holding of stock i in month t and is a proxy for foreign trading volume; and ΔFHi,t=FHi,t-FHi,t-1. The coefficients are averaged across 
monthly estimations.  “St. Dev.” is the standard deviation across all months, ρ(1) is the first-order autocorrelation of the estimated 









).(Dev.St  with T being the 
number of months.  The asterisks *, **, and *** denote one-sided significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
 Panel A: Full Sample – Monthly Estimation 
 β0 ln(σi,t-1) ln(σi,t-2) ln(MCAPi,t-1) ri,t-1 TOVERi,t ri,t FTi,t ΔFHi,t FHi,t-1 R2
Model (1)            
Coefficients -0.437 0.433 0.213 -9.874 -0.19     -0.136 0.341 
St. Dev. 0.574 0.115 0.099 49.41 0.285     0.261  
ρ(1) 0.155 0.212 0.142 0.091 0.231     -0.181  
F-M t-stat -4.35*** 19.1*** 12.6*** -1.30 -3.25***     -5.89***  
Model (2)            
Coefficients -0.832 0.39 0.19 4.794 -0.193 1.226 0.172   -0.161 0.418 
St. Dev. 0.571 0.116 0.104 38.9 0.289 0.715 0.502   0.256  
ρ(1) 0.367 0.279 0.145 0.052 0.149 0.412 0.365   -0.088  
F-M t-stat -5.27*** 14.8*** 10.7*** 0.87 -3.87*** 5.58*** 1.25   -5.85***  
Model (3)            
Coefficients -0.769 0.385 0.185 -2.195 -0.181 1.201 0.206 2.056 -0.67 -0.169 0.428 
St. Dev. 0.585 0.116 0.104 40.9 0.293 0.702 0.504 2.95 1.593 0.267  
ρ(1) 0.378 0.27 0.14 0.103 0.096 0.371 0.412 0.376 -0.001 -0.074  






Table 3 – Continued  
 
 Panel B: Full Sample – Quarterly Estimation 
 β0 ln(σi,t-1) ln(σi,t-2) ln(MCAPi,t-1) ri,t-1 TOVERi,t ri,t FTi,t ΔFHi,t FHi,t-1 R2
Coefficients -0.595 0.42 0.179 0.013 -0.205 0.316 -0.037 0.157 -0.165 -0.112 0.522 
St. Dev. 0.323 0.18 0.114 0.054 0.137 0.186 0.216 0.423 0.634 0.249  
ρ(1) 0.296 -0.245 0.11 -0.021 0.38 -0.122 -0.201 -0.605 -0.077 -0.281  
F-M t-stat -4.58*** 17.66*** 5.78*** 1.16 -3.08*** 9.94*** -1.17 6.89*** -1.39 -3.68***  
 
 
 Panel C: Sub-periods – Monthly Estimation 
 β0 ln(σi,t-1) ln(σi,t-2) ln(MCAPi,t-1) ri,t-1 TOVERi,t ri,t FTi,t ΔFHi,t FHi,t-1 R2
Before Crisis            
Coefficients -1.075 0.334 0.133 -8.097 -0.321 1.279 0.552 3.02 -1.222 -0.193 0.380 
St. Dev. 0.503 0.107 0.09 37.9 0.424 0.464 0.485 3.14 1.43 0.249  
ρ(1) -0.352 0.073 0.112 -0.56 -0.121 -0.019 0.117 -0.105 -0.41 0.211  
F-M t-stat -19.9*** 12.1*** 5.25*** -3.38*** -4.32*** 12.8*** 4.02*** 5.31*** -9.15*** -2.26**  
During Crisis            
Coefficients -0.401 0.412 0.182 -9.254 -0.186 1.247 -0.1 3.354 -0.511 -0.249 0.400 
St. Dev. 0.564 0.121 0.106 52.6 0.134 1.01 0.382 3.93 1.19 0.313  
ρ(1) 0.585 0.715 -0.113 0.405 0.51 0.692 0.254 0.598 0.162 -0.305  
F-M t-stat -0.72 2.19** 8.38*** -0.29 -1.74** 0.87 -0.60 0.83 -1.20 -5.80***  
After Crisis            
Coefficients -0.75 0.41 0.219 4.781 -0.09 1.015 0.161 0.999 -0.153 -0.106 0.464 
St. Dev. 0.522 0.111 0.097 37.6 0.215 0.672 0.428 2.00 1.65 0.205  
ρ(1) 0.234 0.305 0.282 0.073 0.227 0.055 0.339 0.04 -0.191 0.013  




Table 3 – Continued  
 
 Panel D: Foreign Holding Thresholds – Monthly Estimation 








Full Sample            
Coefficients -0.017 -0.216 0.864 0.151 1.548 -0.677 -0.137 -0.073 -0.09 -0.113 0.573 
St. Dev. 0.043 0.229 0.658 0.407 2.421 2.234 1.322 0.507 0.372 0.307  
ρ(1) 0.05 0.117 0.204 0.319 0.273 -0.062 -0.129 -0.276 -0.281 -0.159  
F-M t-stat -2.59*** -6.41*** 6.70*** 1.41 2.92*** -2.56*** -1.50 -2.14** -3.85*** -4.50***  
Before Crisis            
Coefficients -0.023 -0.378 1.055 0.311 2.194 -1.134 -0.173 -0.047 -0.088 -0.055 0.475 
St. Dev. 0.045 0.265 0.44 0.435 2.821 1.227 1.475 0.553 0.456 0.427  
ρ(1) -0.061 -0.286 0.015 0.167 -0.109 -0.119 -0.255 -0.084 -0.252 -0.188  
F-M t-stat -2.26** -15.22*** 10.03*** 2.08** 4.68*** -4.90*** -2.08** -0.64 -2.14** -1.44  
During Crisis            
Coefficients -0.029 -0.15 0.708 -0.043 2.713 -0.721 0.051 -0.04 -0.091 -0.242 0.558 
St. Dev. 0.037 0.151 0.643 0.436 2.826 1.508 1.319 0.353 0.269 0.243  
ρ(1) 0.119 -0.35 0.459 0.274 0.465 0.401 -0.166 -0.263 -0.122 -0.146  
F-M t-stat -2.73*** -7.29*** 1.47 -0.01 1.42 -0.97 0.57 -0.19 -1.32 -5.62***  
After Crisis            
Coefficients -0.005 -0.141 0.731 0.157 0.783 -0.087 -0.098 -0.127 -0.078 -0.096 0.629 
St. Dev. 0.045 0.196 0.765 0.333 1.758 3.027 1.365 0.574 0.361 0.207  
ρ(1) 0.069 0.069 0.052 0.371 -0.014 -0.296 -0.092 -0.404 -0.39 -0.44  
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